The text of the Agreement for Cooperation between The Government of India and The Government of USA concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement) has been released for public scrutiny before final execution. It has faced unprecedented criticism in both countries and is, perhaps, one of the most difficult negotiations carried out in this field in recent times. The contents of the agreement are subject to contradictory interpretations, some of which are fraught with suspicion and mutual mistrust. An analysis of the text is attempted in the present paper.
Atomic Energy Act 1954, WMD has to be interpreted in a narrower sense to mean and refer only to nuclear weapons. This becomes clear as is more specifically mentioned under Article 9 of the Agreement as follows:
"Article 9 -PEACEFUL USE: Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any explosive device or for any military purpose." , on the other hand, has held that if the circumstances may demand otherwise, when intention of the parties is clear, the schedule to the document should not be allowed to override the recital clause. Thus, one would be inclined to infer from the above-mentioned recital clauses in the preamble of the agreement that India's commitment to these pacts becomes mandatory once the Indo-US Bilateral 123-Agreement is executed, since the intention of the parties herein is ambiguous and is not confined to nuclear weapons but to all weapons of mass destruction encompassing the conventional, chemical and biological warfare devices. This may be interpreted by Indian opponents of the agreement as a sinister move to double-check on India since India has already signed and ratified the respective UN Conventions on Conventional Weapons 7 (CCW), Biological Weapons 8 (CBW) and Chemical Weapons 9 (CWC). In this connection it would be prudent to recapitulate the circumstances culminating in the text of the 123-Agreement. Any nuclear trade into which the US may agree to enter with another country has to be in accordance with Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 1954 which provides separate methodologies for a 123-Agreement with a non-nuclear weapons country, whether it be a signatory to the NPT or a non-signatory to the NPT accepting full scope IAEA Safeguards. India is very uniquely placed, being a non-signatory to the NPT but possessing nuclear weapons. It has accepted only voluntary IAEA safeguards for some of its nuclear establishments. In addition, India has not been and cannot be designated as a Nuclear Weapon country under Article IX(3) of the NPT which requires that India should have manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 1967. However, India's first nuclear device was a PNE in 1974 "The parties recognise, with respect to the observance of this agreement, the principle of international law that provides that a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." 
Raison d'être

Fuel supply assurances
The supply of nuclear fuel to India as and when required is assured under Article 5.4 of the agreement that states:
"The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in . . . or operation of reactors for their lifetime. . ."
Under Article 5.6(a) this assurance is established further as:
"The US has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India . . . the US has also affirmed its assurances to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors." and ". . . the US is committed to working with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations."
So far as a continual fuel supply for the operational requirements of the Indian nuclear reactors is concerned it is, apparently, assured. However, the assurance of the continual fuel supply from the US thus given in the 123-Agreement may not fructify in view of the provisions of Section 102 (13) Article 5.6(b)(iii) further assures on strategic reserves for reactor fuels as follows:
"The US will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors."
Also Article 5.6(b)(iv) further states:
"If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the UK to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India."
These provisions in the 123-Agreement will have to be read with Section 103 (b)(10) of The Hyde Act which is relevant: "Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the Government of India for use in safe-guarded civilian nuclear facilities should be commensurate with reasonable operating requirements." This has to be further read with the Joint Explanatory Statement of The Committee of Conference describing the Background and Need for the Legislation (page 12) where it is specifically mentioned that: ". . . US Officials testified, however, that the US does not intend to help build a stockpile of nuclear fuel for the purpose of riding out any sanctions that might be imposed in response to Indian actions such as conducting another nuclear test. . . .. They endorse the Senate proposal, however, that there be a clear US policy that any fuel reserve provided to India should be commensurate with normal operating requirements for India's safeguarded reactors."
This contention is further strengthened from the carefully worded Article 4.1 of the 123-Agreement as:
". . . The parties recognise that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time (emphasis intended) in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations."
In view of these circumstances the assurances on fuel reserves for the lifetime of the reactors can be highly debatable, in spite of what has been incorporated into Article 5.6(b)(iii) of the agreement as mentioned above. 111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  2011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40  1  2  3  4  5  6  711 Hence, except for fuel reserves, the assurances only for normal supplies of nuclear fuel for safeguarded reactors against disruption due to market constraints in the US are contained in the 123-Agreement under Article 5.6(a) & (b). However, many of these provisions appear either casually phrased or relate to uncertain futuristic events. For instance, Article 5.6(b)(i) of the 123-Agreement states: "The US is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the Bilateral US-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act which would be submitted to the US Congress."
The said casualness can be found in this paraphrasing which appears to have been finalised much before the 123-Agreement was actually drafted. In a similar manner, the text of The Indian critics of the Indo-US 123-Agreement have termed such paraphrasing in the agreement as sugar coated and eye-wash.
Safeguards
Undoubtedly India and the US have affirmed their strong support for the objectives of the IAEA and its safeguard system in the preamble of the 123-Agreement. Even though India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has accepted voluntary IAEA safeguards to some of its present nuclear establishments and also committed for those declared as civilian nuclear centres under the separation plan that was presented to the Indian Parliament on 7th March 2006 and, later, in greater detail on 11th May 2006. Needless to say, the separation plan was a prerequisite for a waiver of authority and congressional approval under section 104(b)(1) of The Hyde Act 2006 but the separation plan per se gets no mention in the 123-Agreement except for Article 5.6(c) which mentions it indirectly as: "In the light of the above understandings with the US, an India specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civil use at any time . . .. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA." This is, in fact, a necessary requirement under Section 104(b)(2) of The Hyde Act 2006 for the grant of waiver authority and the congressional approval.
The details of safeguards as provided under Article 10 of the 123-Agreement relate to the nuclear material, equipment and all special materials transferred under the agreement. It may suffice to quote Article 10.2 as:
"Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the USA pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA (identifying data) and an Additional Protocol, when in force."
From the above, one would infer that the safeguards have to be in perpetuity in respect of the material, equipment and/or technology transferred to India under the present agreement or similar derived therefrom and also in respect of the civilian nuclear establishments declared by India under the separation plan for all times to come. This commitment remains even after the determination of The explanatory statement on The Hyde Act 2006 emphasises continued existence of the safeguards regardless of whether the agreement is terminated or suspended by any party for any reason. The act further requires assurances that 'fall-back safeguards' to exist in perpetuity will be an essential feature of any agreement as provided in one or more of such US agreements for cooperation with other countries.
Thus, Article 10.4 anticipates only consultations between the pParties for continuing the safeguards in the event the IAEA fails to fulfill its obligations. Apprehensions abound in India that if the IAEA failed to implement the safeguards for reasons, say, of a shortage of inspecting personnel or finances, will the US then depute its own experts/inspectors for the purpose? This apprehension arises, rightly or wrongly, particularly from the second part of Article 12(3) of the agreement which states:
"When execution of a agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and US organisations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices."
It is doubtful if India has its own trained experts/inspectors to cooperate with the US experts who may have to do it alone.
Termination and cessation of cooperation
Article 14 of the 123-Agreement specifies conditions for termination of the cooperation between the two parties wherein either party may terminate it on one year's written notice, providing the reasons for seeking such termination. In that event, the parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations to address the reasons cited therein. If a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations, the party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under the agreement. In any case, the agreement shall stand terminated one year after the date of notice for termination. It is further provided under Article 14.3 that, following the cessation of the cooperation, either party shall have the right to require the return by the other party of any nuclear material, equipment etc. transferred under the agreement. It is to be noted that all legal obligations pertaining to the agreement shall cease except those relating to the safeguards and other related issues which shall apply with respect to any nuclear items still remaining on the territory of the party concerned.
It is further provided in the agreement that either party exercising the right of return promptly shall compensate, prior to removal of items, that party for their fair market value and for the costs of such removals. However the quantification of the fair market value may become a matter of great dispute.
It ought to be further mentioned here that in a nuclear reactor the material which would be removed (i.e. fuel) on cessation of the agreement may constitute only a minor part of the total cost of the reactor but, on its removal, the rest of the building structure, equipment and other auxiliary establishments associated with the nuclear reactor shall be rendered permanently idle and wasted. The 123-Agreement does not provide for equitable and justifiable damages.
It is significant that the 123-Agreement does not specifically mention nuclear tests as cause of termination of the cooperation but it is enshrined in The Hyde Act and the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
Certification and reporting to the congress
As provided under The Hyde Act 2006, the determination and waiver provisions are extinguished after the enactment of the 123-Agreement through the joint resolution but the US President is still required under section 104(g)(2) of the act to keep appropriate congressional committees fully and currently informed of almost all nuclear activities of India, including those in subsection (H) relating to the amount of uranium mined and milled in India; the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices and the rate of production in India of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices and nuclear explosive devices per se. It need not be emphasised that such information is normally confidential under the domestic law of India and Article 3.4 of the agreement also provides that:
"Restricted data as defined by each Party shall not be transferred under this Agreement."
Thus, authentic information on India's nuclear activities to be submitted by the US President to the appropriate committees is only possible when India amends its Atomic Energy Act 1962. Until such time, will the 123-Agreement remain non-operational?
Under The Hyde Act 2006, it is further mandatory for the US President that within 180 days after the date on which 123-Agreement enters into force, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report as to whether India is in full compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in the agreement and other documents referenced in clauses (i) to (vi) of para (1)(A) and whether India is fully and actively participating in the US and international efforts to dissuade, isolate and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons capability . . . including a description of the specific measures that India has taken in this regard and, if not, assessed what measures US Government has taken to secure India's full and active participation in such efforts.
The Hyde Act 2006, as well as the 123-Agreement, is silent on what would happen in an unfortunate event of India being found and reported by the US President to the congressional committees as lacking in compliance with its aforesaid commitments and obligations and also being adamant in attitude to change its foreign policy or the nuclear policy in conformity with the US policy. Once again, until then will the 123-Agreement remain non-operational?
Uncertainties in the 123-Agreement
Sensitive nuclear technology
Although the 123-Agreement has basically evolved on the understandings expressed in the India-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the two parties, it falls short of a full nuclear cooperation since it provides nothing in respect of sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities which may be transferred pursuant to an amendment (yet undecided) to the present agreement. Article 5.2 of the Agreement provides that this agreement may be amended for the aforesaid purposes if the parties so agree and then the amendment shall 111  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  1011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  2011  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  30  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  40  1  2  3  4  5  6  711 enter into force on the date on which the parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed. It is to be presumed that, when the sgreement is finally enacted by the joint resolution as mentioned above, the amendment of the sgreement shall require the same path to be followed.
Duel use technology
Article 5.2 in the 123-Agreement excludes its applicability to 'dual use' items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities and the transfer of these items will be subject to the parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies. This is seen as a short fall in the aspirations contained in the Joint Statement dated 18th July 2005.
Fuel reprocessing
The major achievement claimed by the Indian negotiators is contained in Article 6(iii) of the agreement which relates to the prior ". . . consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form and content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non nuclear material, or equipment so transferred." India has hardly any reason to rejoice on it since the said article further continues:
"To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards" but the uncertainty glares when the sentence continues "and the parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility."
The parties are yet to agree on arrangements and procedures and consultations thereon "shall begin within six months of a request by either party and will be concluded within one year". It must be kept in mind that, practically, it is India and not the US which would make the 'request' for consultations on the arrangements and procedures after having established the said national reprocessing facility at enormous cost. As mentioned above, if the 'consultations' fail, there being no other further alternative remedy available to India in the 123-Agreement, India could only cry foul. Whether IAEA safeguards yet to be negotiated will provide some relief in this respect is a matter of speculation.
Dispute settlement
Article 15 in the agreement provides:
"Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute."
Disputes are bound to occur, be it because of the IAEA's failure to implement safeguards (paragraph 5), on the fair market price of the material being returned (paragraph 6) or on account of any other reasons and in all cases the 123-Agreement provides for consultations between the parties. The procedure for initiating and conducting 'consultations' has been laid down under Article 13 of the 123-Agreement. In the unfortunate event of consultations failing, there is no further provision in the agreement for the dispute redressal. It is pertinent to mention that the cardinal principle of law requires that disputes should be, firstly, settled by mutual consultations, failing which by conciliation where a third party intervenes and tries to work out a solution by discussing with the concerned parties separately. If that also fails, the process of mediation is adopted where a third party discusses the issues together with the disputants and seeks an amicable solution, failing which arbitration is the next step followed by adjudication before a proper court of law. The dispute settlement under the 123-Agreement contemplates consultations/ negotiations and no further steps.
Conclusions
It would be prudent to presume that the 123-Agreement flows from the Atomic Energy Act 1954 through The Hyde Act 2006 and, once the agreement is formalised in the US after the joint resolution, the waiver granted to the US President gets exhausted while the other provisions of the act survive. Hence, any amendment to it thereafter would be governed by the provisions of the 1954 Act and any US trade with India in nuclear field shall then be regulated as per the provisions in agreement read with the Atomic Energy Act 1954 in view whereof the possibility of nuclear fuel reserves for the lifetime of India's reactors remains questionable.
Termination of the agreement is, theoretically, open to either party but, in practice, it would be India at the receiving end which may face the brunt of fuel supply disruptions. Having made huge investments in infrastructures in nuclear establishments and with the Damocles sword of right of return of the material to the supplier hanging over its head, India gets into double jeopardy, firstly, financial wastage in creating the infra-structures and, secondly, accepting the IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, which India has so far been avoiding by not signing the NPT.
The dispute settlement methodology being confined only to consultations between the parties, the agreement is silent on further remedies if the mutual consultations do not materialise into an amicable settlement.
For a sustained successful nuclear trade between the parties under the agreement, India is unwittingly obliged to several other non-nuclear policy commitments through The Hyde Act even though the 123-Agreement conspicuously does not mention any of these in particular.
